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Cres Barker and Bill Page*
The unprecedented success of the oil producing countries in
negotiating improved terms and prices with the major multinationals
and with industrialised nations of the non-Communist World has
brought to the less developed countries as a group a feeling of
discomfort as well as a sense of new power. On the one hand the
authority and unity with which the OPEC countries conducted
negotiations were novel phenomena which could have untold
repercussions on the relations between such countries, the
international companies, and the industrialised world. On the other
hand the sense of achievement for some countries has been mixed
with severe consequences for many resource-poor and least
developed countries.
One of the questions now being pondered is whether underdeveloped
countries which dominate the supply and reserves of other minerals
can emulate OPEC's example and achieve similar successes. This
article examines some of the considerations which may be applicable
to the strategies and tactics pursued by such countries. The reactions
and counter-measures which might be adopted by the major
companies and the industrialised countries are also examined.
It appears from the OPEC model that there are two main economic
prerequisites for success:-
(a) a few countries must control a large portion of the traded
supply of the good - scarcity in real terms is not essential (since
scarcity can be manufactured), but control is;
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(b) demand must be price inelastic - there must be a vital need for
the commodity, and the possibilities of substitution must be remote
at least in the short-term.
These two conditions are satisfied to a considerable degree in the
cases of copper, bauxite and tin. Four developing countries - Chile,
Peru, Zaire and Zambia - produce most of the world's exportable
supply of copper. Malaysia, Bolivia and Thailand account for 70% of
all tin entering international trade channels. The seven states of the
Intergovernmental Bauxite Association (Australia, Guinea, Guyana,
Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Surinam and Yugoslavia) produce 70% of the
world's bauxite. Table 1 shows the position in respect of known
reserves.
TABLE 1
Location of mineral reserves/countries (percentages)
including Australia
Source: US Bureau of Mines, Minerals Facts and Problems, USGPO, 1970
Strategies
It is evident that the control of the mineral resources of developing
countries is the most important single objective to be pursued by
such states; this means not merely legal control, in the sense of
ownership, but also physical control, i.e. the determination of the
uses to which the resources must be put. The major roles in this
control were hitherto played by foreign investors and multinational
companies. In the United Nations General Assembly and at
UNCTAD the assertion has been made that it is the inalienable right
of all countries to own and control their national resources, and to
make the central economic decisions relating to their development
and use. The development strategies of LDCs are aimed, therefore, at
effecting the necessary changes for maximising the benefits which
they can secure from the exploitation of their natural resources; one
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Mineral Developed Developing Centrally-planned
Bauxite 33 621 5
Copper 37 47 16
Tin 4 79 17
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of the main targets being to reverse the tendency of these countries
being mere producers and exporters of raw materials and to organise
them along industrial and manufacturing lines; another being to
reçlress the economic inbalance between rich and poor countries.
The role of the mining sector in these development strategies is
threefold: -
generating the foreign exchange needed not only for consumer
goods, but more importantly for the capital and intermediate goods
necessary for achieving agricultural and industrial development.
Some countries are almost entirely dependent on this source of
revenue;
generating an important part of government revenues;
producing multiplier effects in the rest of the economy through
employment and local industry linkages.
The history of the mining industry has not demonstrably fulfilled
these objectives. Multinational corporations have dominated the
sector, which has led to its being an enclave in many countries with
minimal impact on the rest of the economy. Furthermore, these
countries have gained little of the actual or potential value of these
resources, be it because of low taxation, low price or low value
added. (Table 2).
TABLE 2
Prices obtained by producers under cif delivery conditions, 1970
Source: Alexander Sutolov: Minerals in World Affairs, The University of
Utah Printing Service, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1973, p.166.
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Raw material Semi-processed Metal bar
Aluminium
Copper
Steel
4 tons bauxite
$20-$30
50 tons 2% ore
$250
1.7 tons ore
$12-$17
2 tons alumina
$120
3 tons 33%
concentrate
$800
1.1 ton sponge
orpigiron
$44
1 ton aluminium
$570
1 ton copper
$1 140
1 ton steel
$110
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This situation arises because multinational corporations in the
extractive industries have objectives which differ from those of host
countries; the main one being maximisation of long-term aggregate
profits, an objective which implies some at least of the following
strategies':-
obtaining the mineral at low price;
producing as much as possible of the value added in their home
country, so as to exert more control over this stage with fewer risks;
obtaining as much as possible of the inputs from the home
country, thus giving them (or their associates) an increased market
and (through the scope for transfer pricing) increased profits. For the
host country, this increases the enclave element, as well as reduces
net foreign exchange earnings;
maximising capital intensity, partly as a result of undervaluation
of capital and overvaluation of labour. This also reduces the risks of
labour problems.
In order to achieve their own national objectives, developing
countries can follow some or all of the following strategies:
maximise government revenues and foreign exchange earnings
from the companies, implying an efficient tax system and high base
prices. Steps towards increased government participation and, in
many cases, also towards full nationalisation are necessary. These
steps lead to maximising government revenues and eventually
complete control, so that the mining sector can be directed to
natiônal objectives and not to the benefit of the corporations. These
are prerequisites for any of the three that follow;
maximise the value added before sale. This not only increases
revenues, but means access to the more competitive and open
markets found further along the line. The processing may be done,
for example, as a joint venture with another country as well as
For a more detailed account of the strategies of multinationals see the paper
by Biplab Dasgupta in this issue.
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domestically. One constraint may be tariff barriers on
semi-fabricated products, which can only be overcome by doing the
further processing in the country where the market is;
produce locally the inputs needed by the mining sector, be they
intermediate or capital goods, achieving many of the
above-mentioned objectives. This would: (a) reduce foreign exchange
expenditures; (b) increase self-reliance, and reduce the dependence
on and so power of - external suppliers: (c) the mining sector,
though not itself a large employer, requires a wide variety of inputs
and so can potentially have a large multiplier effect through the
economy, and a special impact on employment; also (by serving as a
concentrated focus for national effort) this can increase returns from
local R and D and innovative investment; furthermore, these inputs
may also be sold to other countries;
control the markets. This could help achieve high and stable
prices.
Organisational characteristics and some political and international
constraints
The current organisations which deal with copper, bauxite and tin
are CIPEC (the Conseil Intergouvernmental des Pays Exportateurs du
Cuivre), IBA (the Intergovernmental Bauxite Association) and ITC
(The International Tin Council). CIPEC was established in 1967 with
four members: Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia. Although these four
are not the only developing countries which mine and export copper
(Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Iran are others), between them
they produce most of the world's exportable supply, and this is most
important for welding together a viable organisation. Even if the
remaining copper exporting countries were admitted to membership,
the control of policy and decision-making would remain heavily
dominated by the original members.
In the case of bauxite, the seven members of the recently formed
IBA produce two-thirds of the world's bauxite. But there are some
other countries which could, conceivably, become members on the
basis that they are developing countries and are potential significant
producers - for example, Haiti, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hondura& and
India. Again, since it is an association of producers, and not only of
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producer/exporters, the criterion to be used to exclude producers
(for example the USA) will have to be very carefully worked out,
and could possibly pose some difficulty.
The International Tin Council presents a rather different picture.
Membership of the Council is not restricted to producers, although
the producer-members supply well-nigh all the world output. The
major consumers - with the sole exception of the USA, which is
being urged to join - are all members of the Council. This does not
permit decisive action on the part of the producers in any plans that
might be entertained for the carrying out of a policy of output
restriction. Reorganisation to exclude the consumer-members, or the
formation of a separate body to represent the interests of the
producers alone, is a prior requirement for such objectives.2
Even given the most favourable arrangements, structurally and
constitutionally, all these organisations would face difficult
operational problems. The political motivations and aspirations of
their members, and would-be members, are not identical. Although
most of them may clearly bç described as less developed, they cannot
ail be classified as politically non-aligned. Evenin the case of OPEC
there were political differences, but the OAPEC members as a sub
group were coherent enough for their motivation to carry the other
OPEC members with them.
Reactions of multinational corporations and industrialised countries
Both the multinational corporations and the governments of
consuming industrialised countries may be expected to take some
counter measures if there is a proliferation of cartels among the
producer nations. It is interesting and instructive to observe the
effects of the rise in oil prices on the multinational corporations, and
to note that they have emerged at least in the short-term with even
greater profits as a consequence.3 The recent high prices for other
minerals have also made it a prosperous period for multinational
2 Most, but not all, of the members of the syndicate mentioned
were of this opinion.
See the profit figures for the oil companies given in the Diary of Events on the
Oil Market 1970-1974 in this Bulletin.
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corporations. For example, in April, Rio Tinto Zinc announced
profits of some £225 m. in 1973, an increase of 100% on the
previous year. These windfall gains are largely attributable to the fact
that the multinational corporations have continued to control the
marketing and processing stages for the products concerned. It is a
fundamental theme of this article that control over these forward
marketing functions should eventually pass to the producer
countries.
During the oil crisis there was loose talk in The industralised countries
of open aggression against the producers. But it is generally agreed
that this form of retaliation is highly impracticable in the world
politics of the 1970s. It is scarcely inconceivable that any "bloc" of
developed countries would stand idly by while another "bloc"
attempted to annihilate groups of underdeveloped countries.
There are, however, other avenues of retaliation open to the
industrialised nations. One is to join together in a counter "cartel",
and apply pressure by withholding supplies vital to economic
progress, or by collectively reducing their dependence on
commodities from developing countries. Certainly the industrialised
countries between them have sufficient technological knowhow and
capital resources to achieve self-sufficiency quite quickly should they
make a conscious and co-operative decision to do so. Another is the
area of aid. The majority of international lending agencies are
influenced very strongly by the actions and opinions of the
developed countries, especially the USA.
Conclusions - copper as an illustration of the constraints on
producer strategies
We conclude by considering some of the many factors which a
potential cartel would have to take into account, using copper as an
example. There are briefly three sets of such factors which are crucial
in the minerals sector: first, the demand and supply characteristics of
the commodity itself; the second is the technological response
capabilities of the industrialised countries in respect of that
commodity, and in particular the extent to which there is direct
substitutability with another of the commodities in the group under
discussion, and third, constraints internal to the producing countries
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themselves, such as the adverse employment effects of production
cuts.
In respect of the demand and supply characteristics of the
international copper market, account would need to be taken of (a)
on the consumption side, the price and substitution elasticities of
demand together with observed trends in the uses of the product and
in the level of industrial activity in the importing countries (b) on the
production side, the elasticity of the rest of the world supply, given a
particular market share of the cartel; and also the cost and potential
of scrap recycling.4
The technological response of industrialised countries remains an
important constraint on the longer-term viability of a unilateral price
increase by producer/exporters. There are the possibilities of:
substituting supply from alternative sources; developing
previously uneconomic deposits (from low grade ores or seabed
nodules); and substituting with alternative materials (see Table. 3);
increased recycling which would reduce demand for, and use of,
new supplies. Copper does not in general degenerate in any of the
uses to which it is put; which implies that increased technological
and organisational capacity for collection, separation, resmelting and
so on could significantly increase the proportion of the metal
re-cycled;
using materials more efficiently, by different designs and
lengthened product lifetimes. For example, modern telephone cables
use about 25% of the copper needed a few decades ago.
In respect of these substitution possibilities it should be particularly
borne in mind that most of the consuming countries would not, even
under extreme circumstances, have to replace supplies or eliminate
demand, for all their consumption, but only that part which they
An econometric model could be used both to obtain values for the important
elasticities and to examine the limits of those values which would make cartel
action feasible. The preliminary results of one such model discussed by one of
the syndicate members suggeted that a 1% CIPEC production cut (given its
present market share) would result in a 1/2% increase in price.
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import. In the cases of tin and bauxite, this is the bulk, but for
copper it is a much smaller percentage. Consequently, small savings
from each of several technological or organisational responses could
in the case of copper eventually reduce drastically the dependence of
importers on imported supplies.
TABLE 3
Uses of and Substitutes for Copper, 1970
Notes: ÇA)= actua' y used now as a substitute
(P) strong potential threat
a = global estimates for 1970
Source: US Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems, USGPO, 1970
The other important aspect of these substitution possibilities is the
evident necessity of close communication with the bauxite producers
before any contemplated market strategies in copper are put into
action. Aluminium appears to be quite a ready substitute in many of
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Use % of Totala
Examples of
Applications Substitutes
Electrical 47 Heavy transmission
cable
Aluminium (A)
Telephone cable Aluminium (P)
Industrial
Equipment 19 Brass valves Special steels
Construction 16 Includes wiring Aluminium (P)
Water Pipes Plastic and stainless
steels (A)
Decorative Plastic,
aluminium (A)
Transport 9 Car radiators Aluminium (A)
Air cooling (A)
Miscellaneous
goods
6 Pewter (small Cu
ontent)
Plastic, glass,
Cu-free pewter (A)
Defence 3
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the applications which currently use copper. It is possible to visualise
a situation in which the absence of cooperation between the two
producer organisations would mean less gain for the initiator of
market action aimed at raising prices than for the producers of the
other commodity, particularly if the latter were to increase
production to meet increased demand for substitution purposes.
The final consideration is that of the internal effects within mineral
producing countries of a strategy which might require production
cuts. Unlike the case of the oil producers, the mining industry is a
substantial source of employment in the major mineral exporting
countries, and it is not possible to cut back production without
affecting the level of employment. This acts as a most severe
constraint on the potential of mineral exporting governments to
manoeuvre freely on international market strategy criteria alone.
In spite of these constraints, many of which are much more severe
than in the special case of oil, we would conclude that mineral
exporters are potentially capable of solving the difficulties and
following a price-increasing strategy. The fact that many
complexities, absent in the case of oil, require identification,
quantification and special policies, need not imply that the task is
impossible. We should recall that it took 13 years from inception for
OPEC to overcome the obstacles to a united and successful action -
the mineral exporters at least start with the advantage of OPEC's
precedence in the solution of many problems.
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